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PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH A
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: THE CASE OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Brice Dickson*
INTRODUCTION
T HIS article explores the South African Constitutional Court's
early record in protecting human rights. After considering the or-
igins of the Court and the jurisdiction conferred on it first by the In-
terim Constitution of 1994 and then by the Constitution of 1996, this
article summarizes the provisions of those constitutions which protect
human rights. It then analyzes the decisions of the Court which relate
to those provisions; all forty-eight cases decided by the Court during
its first twenty-nine months of existence are surveyed. The results of
this analysis are presented under two headings: decisions on proce-
dural points and decisions on substantive points. Finally, this article
briefly identifies the most prominent features of this jurisprudence
and assesses the Constitutional Court's achievements to date.
I. How THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT WAS ESTABLISHED
The Constitutional Court of South Africa was first provided for by
section 98 of the Interim Constitution of 1994 and has been opera-
tional since February 15, 1995. Today it exists by virtue of section 167
of the Constitution of 1996, which came into force on February 4,
1997. During the Multi-Party Negotiating Process which led to the
drafting of the Interim Constitution there was little disagreement over
the need for such a Court: all agreed that the country needed to be
governed by a new basic document. Because the Constitution radi-
cally changed the dominant political and legal culture, it was natural
to want it reviewed by a new and specialized body of judges.' The
judges who had functioned during the apartheid era were not, it was
generally felt, appropriate individuals to sit in judgment over the ef-
fects of the new Constitution.2 As a result, the system used in coun-
tries such as Germany, which has a Federal Constitutional Court as
well as a Federal Supreme Court, was adopted, in preference to the
* Professor of Law, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland. The author grate-
fully acknowledges financial assistance from the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust
and the British Academy. He also wishes to thank the staff of the Registrar's Office
at the Constitutional Court for facilitating his research.
1. Lourens du Plessis & Hugh Corder, Understanding South Africa's Transitional
Bill of Rights 194-200 (1994).
2. See generally Democracy and the Judiciary (Hugh Corder ed., 1989) (analyzing
the history of the South African judiciary).
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systems used in places such as Canada,3 the United States, and Ire-
land, where the Supreme Court deals with constitutional cases as well
as other cases. In South Africa the highest court for non-constitu-
tional matters is the Supreme Court of Appeal, known prior to the
1996 Constitution as the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa consists of a President, a
Deputy President, and nine other judges. It always sits en banc, and
every case must be heard by at least eight judges.4 The President and
the Deputy President are appointed by the President of the country,
"after consulting the Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of
the parties represented in the National Assembly."5 The Judicial Ser-
vice Commission, composed of at least seventeen members, was one
of the many new bodies first created by the 1994 Interim Constitution
to help ease the transition to the new society heralded by the fall of
the apartheid regime.' Under the Interim Constitution, four of the
judges on the Constitutional Court were appointed by the President of
the country from among the existing judges of the Supreme Court, "in
consultation with the Cabinet and with the Chief Justice," while the
remaining judges were appointed, "in consultation with the Cabinet
and after consultation with the President of the Constitutional Court,"
from among the nominees recommended by the Judicial Service Com-
mission.7 Under the 1996 Constitution, all of the Court's judges apart
from the President and Deputy President are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the country, "after consulting the President of the Constitu-
tional Court and the leaders of parties represented in the National
Assembly,"8 from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial Service
Commission; however, four members of the Court must be currently
serving as judges at the time of their appointment to the Constitu-
tional Court.
3. For an excellent survey see Leon Trakman, Interpreting a Bill of Rights: Can-
ada and South Africa Compared, in Interpreting a Bill of Rights 26-49 (Johan Kruger
& Brian Currin eds., 1994).
4. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. VIII, § 167(2).
5. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. VIII, § 174(3). The Interim Constitution had
provided only that the President of the Court was to be appointed by the President of
the country "in consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with the Chief
Justice." The interim Constitution, Act No. 200 of 1993, effective on January 28, 1994
(Government Gazette, vol. 343, No. 15466) [hereinafter Republic of S. Afr. Interim
Const.].
6. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 105(1). See section
178 of the Constitution of 1996, which increases the minimum membership to twenty-
three. The Commission is also charged with advising the national government on all
matters relating to the judiciary and the administration of justice. Republic of S. Afr.
Const. ch. VIII, § 178(5).
7. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 99(3)-(5). Vacan-
cies were filled in the same way, depending on the category of judge replaced. Repub-
lic of S. Afr. Interim Const. ch. VII, § 99(5)-(7).
8. Republic of S. Afr. Const., supra note 5, ch. VIII, § 174(4).
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In recommending its original nominees for the Constitutional
Court, the Judicial Service Commission had to "have regard to the
need to constitute a court which is independent and competent and
representative in respect of race and gender."9 In an attempt to make
the initial appointing process more transparent, the Commission con-
ducted public interviews with twenty-four candidates in October,
1994, before recommending six of them for appointment. President
Nelson Mandela duly appointed all six.
Six of the eleven judges forming the initial Court were white
males,' 0 one was a white female,1 three were non-white males12 and
one was a non-white female.13 Only four of the eleven had been
judges at any level before 1994.14 The Court's President was, and is,
Arthur Chaskalson, who became well-known during the apartheid era
as the Director of the Legal Resources Centre, a non-governmental
organization which sought to provide legal services to indigent people
throughout the country. 5 The Court's Deputy President was Ismail
Mahomed, who at the same time was a senior judge in Namibia,
Lesotho, and Swaziland. In October, 1996, Mr. Mahomed was named
as the next Chief Justice of South Africa, the first non-white person to
hold that office. He took up this post early in 1997 and one of the
existing Constitutional Court judges, Justice Langa, was named as the
replacement Deputy President. As of the end of July, 1997, a new
judge had not been appointed to the Constitutional Court to fill the
vacancy, even though in 1995 and 1996 a replacement judge was ap-
pointed from time to time to provide cover for the absent Justice
Goldstone, who had earlier been appointed as Chief Prosecutor at the
War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague for both the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
By the 1994 Constitution, all judges of the Constitutional Court
were appointed for non-renewable seven-year terms. The 1996 Con-
stitution extended the term of office to twelve years.'" This was a
widely predicted reform; many felt that seven years was too short a
time for a person to become proficient as a constitutional judge. Mak-
ing the appointments renewable, however, could have led to accusa-
9. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5. ch. VII, § 99(5)(d). For more
details about the selection process, see Brice Dickson, South Africa's Constitutional
Court, 145 New L.J. 246 (1995).
10. President Chaskalson and Justices Ackermann, Didcott, Goldstone, Kriegler,
and Sachs.
11. Justice O'Regan.
12. Deputy President Mahomed, and Justices Langa and Madala.
13. Justice Mokgoro.
14. Deputy President Mahomed and Justices Ackermann, Didcott, and Kriegler.
15. For an account of the Centre's role in providing legal services see Richard L
Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980-1994
(1995).
16. Compare Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. VIII. § 176(1) with Republic of S. Afr.
Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 99(1).
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tions of political interference with the judicial function if some
appointments were renewed but others were not. The twelve-year ap-
pointment period, however, is subject to the obligation to retire at the
age of seventy.1 7 Because Arthur Chaskalson was sixty-three when
appointed in 1994, a new President will need to be appointed in 2001.
II. THE TYPES OF JURISDICTION VESTING IN THE COURT
When a country abandons Parliamentary sovereignty it must decide
where sovereignty is to reside instead. In Ireland, for example, the
Constitution of 1937 firmly locates sovereignty in the people, so that a
referendum is the ultimate decision-making instrument. In the Con-
stitution of the United States, sovereignty is more dispersed, thanks to
the system of checks and balances operating among the President, the
Congress, and the Supreme Court. In South Africa, although this is
not made absolutely explicit in either the 1994 Interim Constitution or
the 1996 Constitution, it is clear that sovereignty now rests with the
Constitutional Court. Indeed, the key feature of both recent Consti-
tutions is that the South African Parliament no longer has the ultimate
say over whether a law is or is not valid. The Diceyan preference for
absolute majority rule has been abandoned, and in the future no Par-
liament can pass laws which are contrary to the standards laid down in
the Constitution, in particular to the guarantees of human rights."8
South Africa has had a written Constitution since 1910, but until 1994
it coexisted with the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty-as did, for
example, the Constitution of the Irish Free State from 1921 to 1937.
The pre-1994 written Constitution regulated only the institutional
framework of South African society, not the basic rights of its citizens;
the judges, moreover, refused to rule on anything they deemed a
"political" question. 9
The 1994 Constitution conferred an extensive jurisdiction on the
new Court, which is largely maintained by the 1996 Constitution. On
some issues the Court has exclusive jurisdiction and on others it has
concurrent jurisdiction with other courts. Cases come to the Court in
one of three ways: by virtue of an appeal, by virtue of a reference or,
exceptionally, by virtue of a direct application on the part of a litigant.
The Court's exclusive jurisdiction allows it to:
(a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or pro-
vincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, powers or func-
tions of any of those organs of state; (b) decide on the
17. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. VIII, § 176(l).
18. See generally Hugh Corder, South Africa's Transitional Constitution: Its De-
sign and Implementation, 1996 Pub. L. Rev. 291 (discussing the background, imple-
mentation, and future of the transitional constitution).
19. See L.W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial
Review, 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 59, 61-64 (1989). Professor Ackermann is now
a judge on the Constitutional Court.
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constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill ... ; (c) de-
cide that Parliament or the President has failed to comply with a
constitutional duty; or (d) certify a provincial constitution .... 20
Previously, the third of these matters were not included in the Court's
exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand, the 1996 Constitution om-
mitted from the list a previously crucial part of the Court's exclusive
role: determining the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament. That
issue is now part of the jurisdiction which the Constitutional Court
shares with other courts: By section 167(5) of the 1996 Constitution,
the Constitutional Court "makes the final decision whether an Act of
Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitu-
tional, and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme
Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status, before that
order has any force."2 1 This means that many of the ancien regime
judges still serving in the Supreme Court and High Court will have to
adapt their thinking to the new legal order;2- disappointed litigants
can then appeal to the Constitutional Court.
If a matter falling within the Constitutional Court's exclusive juris-
diction arises during a case being heard in another court, it must be
referred to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. The Interim Consti-
tution laid down precise rules as to how and when such referrals were
to occur; these were not repeated in the 1996 Constitution, but are
likely to appear within an Act of Parliament. The 1994 provisions, as
we shall see, gave rise to many problems of interpretation within the
Constitutional Court's first two years.' Matters arising in a provincial
or local division of the Supreme Court had to be referred directly to
the Constitutional Court;24 matters arising in a lower court or tribu-
nal-or in the Supreme Court of one of the former "black homeland"
territories2-had to be referred first to the Supreme Court and then
to the Constitutional Court.26 The Supreme Court had to refer a mat-
ter if it might be decisive for the case, and if the Supreme Court con-
sidered it in the interest of justice to make a referral.2 7 If the Supreme
20. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. VIII, § 167(4).
21. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. VIII, § 167(5); see also Republic of S. Afr.
Const. ch. VIII, § 172(2)(c) ("National legislation must provide for the referral of an
order of constitutional invalidity to the Constitutional Court .... ); Republic of S.
Afr. Const. ch. VIII, § 172(2)(d) ("Any person or organ of state with a sufficient in-
terest may appeal, or apply directly, to the Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an
order of constitutional invalidity by a court ....").
22. At least one commentator is optimistic that they will rise to the challenge. See
Gretchen Carpenter, Constitutional Interpretation B'y the Eristing Judiciary in South
Africa - "Can New Wine Be Successfidly Decanted Into Old Bottles?," 28 Comp. &
Int'l LJ. of S. Afr. 322 (1995).
23. See infra Part V.
24. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 102.
25. These territories compromised Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei.
26. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 103.
27. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5. ch. VII, § 102(1). Before
referring the case, however, the Supreme Court must hear any evidence which it is
19971
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Court decided not to refer an issue, an appeal against this decision
could be brought to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.28
That Division then had to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court
if a decision on the constitutional issue was necessary for the purposes
of disposing of the appeal.29
As well as hearing cases on appeal and by way of reference, the
Constitutional Court also allows some litigants direct access. In the
Interim Constitution this was provided for by section 100(2), which
read: "The rules of the Constitutional Court may make provision for
direct access to the Court where it is in the interest of justice to do so
in respect of any matter over which it has jurisdiction."3 The ration-
ale for this rather unusual provision was to create a court which is
indeed open to all because the previous South African regime had, in
effect, denied access to justice to vast numbers of people simply by
making the courts too remote and costly. In reality, however, any re-
versal of this approach can only be nominal and symbolic because the
floodgates would open otherwise. Rule 17 of the Constitutional Court
Rules of 1995, which fleshes out section 100(2), is therefore quite con-
servative in its scope:
The Court shall allow direct access in terms of section 100(2) of the
Constitution in exceptional circumstances only, which will ordina-
rily exist only where the matter is of such urgency, or otherwise of
such public importance, that the delay necessitated by the use of the
ordinary procedures would prejudice the public interest or preju-
dice the ends of justice and good government. 31
Part IV(a) demonstrates that these provisions were at the heart of
nearly a quarter of the cases decided by the Constitutional Court in its
first two years. Direct access was allowed in five cases, but denied in a
further six. The 1996 Constitution has done little to clarify matters,
because section 167(6) provides only that "[n]ational legislation, or
the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in
the interest of justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court, (a)
to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court or (b) to appeal
directly to the Constitutional Court from any other court. '32 Part III
now analyzes the fundamental guarantees of the South African Bill Of
Rights.
necessary to hear for the purposes of deciding the issue and make a finding thereon; if
there are other issues in the case, the proceedings must be suspended pending the
decision of the Constitutional Court on the issue referred.
28. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 102(4).
29. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 102(6).
30. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 100(2).
31. Matthew Chaskalson et al., Constitutional Law of South Africa § 7, at 23
(1996).
32. Republic of S. Aft. Const. ch. VIII, § 167(6).
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III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS-3
The hallmark of the apartheid regime was the violation of human
rights. Thus, the architects of the Interim Constitution strove to en-
sure that human rights would thenceforward be fully protected.
Chapter 3 (sections 7 to 35) was entitled "Fundamental Rights," and,
in content, was comparable in many respects to the standard interna-
tional documents on human rights, in particular the Council of Eu-
rope's Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950) and the United Nations' Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966).a' Protections guaranteed include the right to equality before
the law and to equal protection of the law, the right not to be discrimi-
nated against on grounds such as race, gender, sexual orientation, age
or disability, the right to life, the right to freedom and security of the
person, the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, the right not to be subjected to
forced labor, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of conscience,
religion, thought, belief and opinion, the right to freedom of speech
and expression, the right to assemble, the right to associate with
others, the right to freedom of movement and to choose one's place of
residence anywhere in the country, the right to participate in political
parties, to vote and to stand for election, the right when arrested to
consult with a lawyer and to be given a fair trial, the right to form and
join trade unions or employers' organizations, and the right to acquire
and hold property.
In some important respects, however, the 1994 Constitution went
further than the standard international documents. Indeed, the per-
sons drafting the document searched the world for more unusual mod-
els from which to borrow. While keeping in mind the particular needs
of the South African situation, they were especially influenced by the
German Constitution of 1949 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms of 1982. Chapter 3 therefore also protected the right to re-
spect for one's dignity, the right to demonstrate and present petitions,
the right to have disputes settled by a court of law, the right of access
to information held by the state if such information is required for the
protection of one's other rights, the right to lawful, procedurally fair
and reasoned administrative action, the right of arrested persons to be
charged or released within 48 hours and to be told that they have the
right to remain silent, the right freely to engage in economic activity,
33. Amongst the most useful literature on this topic are the pieces by Lourens du
Plessis & Hugh Corder, Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 49-
58 (1994), Alfred Cockrell, The South African Bill of Rights and the 'Duck/Rabbit', 60
Mod. L. Rev. 513 (1997), and Sydney Kentridge, Bills of Rights - The South African
Experiment, 112 L.Q. Rev. 237 (1996) (reflecting on Mr. Kentridge's experiences on
the Constitutional Court).
34. Anton J. Steenkamp, The South African Constitution of 1993 [sicj and the Bill
of Rights: An Evaluation in Light of International Human Rights Norms. 17 Hum.
Rts. Q. 101, 106-13 (1995).
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the right to fair labor practices, the right to a healthy environment,
and the right to basic education and to instruction in the language of
one's choice where this is reasonably practicable. Special mention is
also made of children's rights.
Nevertheless, Chapter 3 did not confer all rights in absolute terms.
But rather than follow the format of the European Convention, which
allows the rights conferred to be taken away if factors such as public
order, morality or the economy so dictate, Chapter 3 relied upon a
general limitation clause. The clause provided that the rights en-
trenched could be limited provided such limitation was (a) reasonable,
(b) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom
and equality, and (c) not contrary to the essential content of the right.
In many instances the limitation also had to be necessary. In theory,
no right, not even the right not to be tortured, was made immune from
limitations, but it is difficult to conceive of circumstances where the
breach of truly basic rights would not be viewed as negating the essen-
tial content of those rights.
Perhaps surprisingly, the 1994 Constitution also allowed for the sus-
pension of some of the rights in Chapter 3 in times of emergency.3 -
However, such an emergency first had to be proclaimed by Act of
Parliament and was permitted only "where the security of the Repub-
lic is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder or
at a time of national disaster."36 Courts of law were permitted to ad-
judicate upon the validity of a declaration of emergency, and a decla-
ration could not remain valid for longer than twenty-one days unless it
was extended through a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority in
the National Assembly. No action taken as a result of a state of emer-
gency could create retrospective crimes or indemnify any representa-
tive of the state for unlawful behavior, nor could the emergency be
allowed to interfere with the right not to be discriminated against, the
right to life and dignity, the right to be free from torture or forced
labor, the right to freedom of belief, and the right to fair labor prac-
tices. Basic children's rights were also inviolable. Persons detained
during a state of emergency were entitled at all times to have access to
a legal representative and a medical practitioner of their choice and
had to be given written reasons for their continued detention. During
a state of emergency the Constitution even permitted detainees to be
held for up to ten days before needing to be brought before a court.
To help ensure that Chapter 3 was really effective, however, further
constitutional provisions encouraged South African society to adopt a
human rights culture. For a start, the Constitution specifically di-
rected all courts when interpreting Chapter 3 to "promote the values
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and
35. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 34.
36. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 34(1).
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equality.13 7 The courts also had to regard relevant international
human rights law and could, if they desired, look to comparable for-
eign case law.38 Courts which have been dealing with constitutional
cases have already referred on many occasions to similar cases de-
cided in Canada, the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.
The 1994 Constitution also provided several non-judicial mecha-
nisms for implementing the rights guaranteed by Chapter 3.19 The
Public Protector was the new name given to the ombudsman in South
Africa.4' The person appointed must be nominated by a joint commit-
tee of the Houses of Parliament and approved by seventy-five percent
of those present at a joint meeting of the Houses. He or she can in-
vestigate any maladministration, abuse of power or improper conduct
allegedly committed by a person performing a public function. Addi-
tionally, all organs of state are required to accord such assistance as
may be reasonably required to protect the independence, impartiality,
dignity, and effectiveness of the Public Protector.
The Human Rights Commission, also created by the 1994 Constitu-
tion, is an eleven-member body operational since early 1996 and
tasked with promoting the observance of fundamental rights, develop-
ing a public awareness of those rights, and recommending new meas-
ures to protect them.4' It can also investigate any alleged violation of
fundamental rights and assist a victim to secure redress. If it believes
that any proposed legislation might breach Chapter 3 or international
human rights law, the Commission must immediately report this to the
legislature concerned. The Constitution of 1994 also created the Com-
mission on Gender Equality which is supposed to promote gender
equality and advise and make recommendations to Parliament regard-
ing any laws or proposed legislation affecting such equality."2 In addi-
tion, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was created
principally to investigate the merits of claims, settle disputes and pro-
vide evidence to courts. Finally, the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission was established4" to hear evidence and grant amnesties
37. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 35(l); see Lourens
du Plessis, The Genesis of the Provisions concerned with the Application and Interpre-
tation of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in South Africa's Transitional Constitu-
tion, J. S. Afr. L. 706 (1994).
38. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 35(1).
39. The 1996 Constitution maintains these institutions and creates in addition a
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious
and Linguistic Communities. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. III, §§ 185-86.
40. Republic of S. Afr. Coast. ch. III, § 182-83. The term -Office of the Ombud"
is sometimes used in South Africa.
41. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. III, § 184.
42. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. III, § 187.
43. By the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. See
AZAPO v. The President of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC) (discussed
infra in Part V).
1997] 539
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concerning human rights abuses and other crimes committed prior to
President Mandela's inauguration on May 10, 1994.44
All of the decisions made by the Constitutional Court in its first
twenty-nine months of existence were based on the provisions of the
1994 Interim Constitution. Of the forty-eight decisions in question,45
twenty-six required a decision regarding whether an existing law vio-
lated the human rights provisions in Chapter 3. In analyzing how the
Court dealt with those cases, it is therefore not necessary to consider
what changes to the human rights provisions were made by the 1996
Constitution, but it is of interest to note them here as these issues will
become the focus of the Court's attention in the years to come.
On September 6, 1996, the Constitutional Court refused to certify
that the new draft Constitution drawn up by the Constitutional As-
sembly and issued in May, 1996, fully complied with the Constitu-
tional Principles set out in Schedule 4 to the 1994 Interim
Constitution.46 Amongst the defects indicated were that the funda-
mental rights, freedoms, and civil liberties in the new text were not
"entrenched" as required by Constitutional Principle 2 and that the
right of individual employers to engage in collective bargaining was
not protected as required by Constitutional Principle 27.47 The As-
sembly had to take back the text and rework it before submitting it for
further scrutiny by the Court. Eventually, on December 4, 1996, the
Court felt satisfied enough to issue a certification order.4" There had
been four challenges to the provisions on fundamental rights, but the
Court rejected all of them. First, the Court did not accept that section
22 was defective in giving only citizens the right to choose a trade,
occupation or profession. Second, it did not accept that the new Con-
stitution failed sufficiently to protect collective rights of self-determi-
nation. Third, the exclusion of certain rights from those made non-
derogable during a state of emergency was not a fatal flaw. Fourth,
the Court found there was nothing in the new Constitution to suggest
that declarations of martial law could be issued in the future.
Chapter 2 in the 1996 Constitution, entitled "Bill of Rights," has
four more sections than Chapter 3 of the 1994 Constitution.49 One of
these is section 7, which boldly asserts in subsection (1) that "[t]his
44. The original cut-off date was December 6, 1993, the date when the Interim
Constitution was adopted, but President Mandela extended it on December 13, 1996.
45. This article is based on all decisions taken up to and including July 15, 1997.
46. 1996 (4) SALR 744 (CC) (ruling by a unanimous judgment, but in the absence
of Justice Ackermann who was ill); see also Vera Sacks, Due Process in Making a
Constitution, 146 New L.J. 1237, 1238 n.ed. (1996) (noting that the 1996 Constitution
cannot come into force until certified by the Constitutional Court).
47. In all, nine defects were noted, including a failure to allocate sufficient powers
to provincial legislatures and an attempt to make the Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act of 1995 immune from constitutional review.
48. It was signed by the President on December 10, 1996, International Human
Rights Day.
49. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, §§ 7-39.
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Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. [It] en-
shrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the demo-
cratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom."'  Subsection
(2) goes on to say that the state must not only respect, protect and
fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights, but also promote them. The
other new sections deal with the right of access to adequate housing,"
the right of access to health care, food, water, and social security,52
and the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities.53
There are also important changes to some of the sections that were
included in the 1994 Constitution. For example, the new section 12,
on freedom and security of the person, expressly includes the right to
make decisions concerning reproduction, the right to control over
one's body, and the right not to be subjected to scientific experiments
without informed consent. The new section 21, on freedom of move-
ment and residence, confers on every citizen the right to a passport.
The new section 35, on the rights of arrested, detained, and accused
persons, confers the right to remain silent, while the right to a fair
trial, enshrined in the new section 35(3) describes fifteen species of
that right in place of the former ten.
The new limitation clause in the 1996 Bill of Rights, section 36, is
both more and less demanding than its 1994 counterpart. It is more
demanding in that it requires any limitation to have regard for human
dignity and not just for equality and freedom. This is more than out-
weighed, however, by the elimination of the requirements that the
limitation must not negate the essential content of the right in ques-
tion and that, for some rights, the limitation must be necessary. The
provision on states of emergency-the new section 37-has also
changed. It now stipulates that any legislation enacted in consequence
of a declared state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights
only if it is consistent with South Africa's obligations under interna-
tional law applicable to states of emergency. Likewise, the Table of
Non-Derogable Rights differs in some respects from the list included
in section 34(5) of the 1994 Interim Constitution. It is interesting,
moreover, that section 8 now expressly requires a court, when apply-
ing the Bill of Rights, to apply, or where necessary, develop, the com-
mon law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to the
right.54 A court may also, conversely, develop rules of the common
law to limit the right provided the limitation accords with section 36."
50. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 7(1).
51. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 26.
52. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 27.
53. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 31.
54. This seems to endorse the Constitutional Court's decision in Shabalah v. At-
torney-General Transvaal, 1996 (1) SALR 725 (CC): see infra Part V.
55. The Constitution reads:
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the execu-
tive, the judiciary, and all organs of state. (2) A provision of the Bill of
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S PROCEDURAL DECISIONS
AFFECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
A. When is a Litigant Granted Direct Access To the Court?
A great deal of time and effort during the Constitutional Court's
first two years was devoted to clarifying the methods by which an is-
sue can be brought before it. The complicated jurisdictional provi-
sions in sections 98 and 100-103 of the Interim Constitution caused no
end of problems, particularly regarding direct access to the Court.
These issues had to be analyzed in the very first case decided by the
Court, S v. Zuma 6 The substantive issue was whether section
217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, which dealt with
the admissibility of confession evidence, was consistent with the In-
terim Constitution. The Court held that the issue should not have
been referred to it, given that the parties in the case had exercised
their power under section 101(6) of the Constitution to ask the
Supreme Court to decide the issue-a request the Supreme Court had
wrongly rejected. But rather than send the case back to that Court,
with all the consequential delay that would have entailed, the Consti-
tutional Court decided to consider the issue itself. Under section
100(2) of the Interim Constitution, the Court, following a request
from the Attorney-General for Natal, granted direct access because it
was in the interest of justice that a binding decision on the validity of
section 217(1)(b)(ii) be given as soon as possible.57
In S v. Mhlungu 8 argued before the Court on the same day as
Zuma, the issue was whether the invalidity of section 217(1)(b)(ii)
should apply even in cases that were pending when the Constitution
came into force. The Court again held that the reference to it was
improper, because the effect of the Interim Constitution on pending
cases was one of interpretation of the Constitution and not, therefore,
within the exclusive competence of the Constitutional Court: The
judge in the Natal Provincial Division should himself have decided the
issue. Once more, though, the Court remedied the faulty reference by
Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the extent that, it is appli-
cable, taking into account the nature of the right and of any duty imposed by
the right. (3) In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to natural and
juristic persons in terms of subsection (2), a court - (a) in order to give effect
to a right in the Bill, must apply or, where necessary, develop the common
law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b)
may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the
limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 8.
56. 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC); see Gerhard Erasmus & Hennie Strydom, Judgments
on the Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 1995 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 264, 264-69
(discussing Zuma in detail).
57. The Court then proceeded to strike down the sub-paragraph as inconsistent
with the Interim Constitution. See infra Part V.
58. 1995 (3) SALR 867 (CC).
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dealing with the case as if it were a direct access application under
section 100(2), even though there was no specific request from any
official for that to be done.59 The rationale for so acting is not clear
from the judgment in the case. Justice Kentridge did, however, say
that before a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court refers
an issue to the Constitutional Court,6' it should be of the opinion not
only that the issue "might be decisive of the case" and that a referral is
"in the interest of justice," but also that there is a reasonable prospect
that the law or provision in question will be held invalid by the Consti-
tutional Court.6' Given how careful the Constitutional Court has
otherwise been not to imply additional words into the Constitution,
this is a rather remarkable judicial ruling, no doubt prompted,
although not expressly so, by a worry that the Constitutional Court
might otherwise be inundated with referrals.
Likewise, in S v. Mbatha,62 the first decision issued in 1996, the
Court overlooked a faulty reference and acceded to an unopposed
oral request from counsel for the applicant that the matter in question
should be dealt with as if it were a direct access application. The
Court stressed the need for certainty in the area of law involved,
which was the extent of the presumption of innocence in cases where
persons are charged with possession of firearms. 3 However, in a case
where two matters were combined for simultaneous adjudication, S v.
Vermaas and S v. Du Plessis, 4 the Court refused to rectify a faulty
reference regarding the right of an accused to legal representation-
guaranteed by section 25(3)(e) of the Interim Constitution. Justice
Didcott said that direct access should be permitted only in truly excep-
tional settings. There was no such setting here because the Constitu-
tional Court was "ill equipped for the factual findings and assessments
which the enquiry entails. '65 While this conclusion might at first
glance seem odd, it must be remembered that section 25(3)(e) gives a
right to legal representation at state expense only "where substantive
injustice would otherwise result."'66 Nevertheless, the Court has been
criticized for not taking a more proactive stand in this case. '
59. Id at 889-90.
60. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 102(1).
61. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR at 892-93 (Kentridge, J., concurring). This is a re-
quirement imported from Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII,
§ 103(4), which deals with referrals of issues originating in courts other than the
Supreme Court.
62. 1996 (2) SALR 464 (CC).
63. Id at 475. It went on to strike down the legislative provision in question. See
infra Part V.
64. 1995 (3) SALR 292 (CC).
65. Id at 299.
66. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 95(3).
67. See Human Rights Committee of South Africa, The Constitutional Court 1995
- The First Year 8, 22 (1996).
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Luitingh v. Minister of Defence68 involved a claim by a former un-
dercover employee of the Ministry of Defence for money which he
said was owed to him under a contract with the Ministry. Part of the
Ministry's defense was that the claim was time-barred. The Constitu-
tional Court struck the referral off the roll because the referring judge
had not properly considered whether the issue was "decisive for the
case," or whether a referral was "in the interest of justice. ' 69 The
judge had suggested that sections 26 and 27 of the Interim Constitu-
tion were in question-protecting the rights to engage freely in eco-
nomic activity and to benefit from fair labor practices-but had given
no explanation as to how. Direct access to the Court was refused be-
cause there was no pressing need for a definite and final decision on a
controversial point springing up frequently throughout the country.
The Court even held that the respondents in the case should bear their
own costs because they had done nothing to oppose the referral to the
Constitutional Court.7"
The decision in Luitingh was distinguished in Brink v. Kitshoff
NO,71 where the Court did allow direct access even though the refer-
ral was yet again defective. The issue in Brink was whether section 44
of the Insurance Act of 1943 was in conflict with the Constitution in so
far as it discriminated against married women by depriving them, in
certain circumstances, of some or all of the benefits of life insurance
policies ceded to them or made in their favor by their husbands before
they became insolvent, while no similar limitation affected a life insur-
ance policy ceded in favor of a husband by a wife. President Chaskal-
son pointed out that the Constitutional Court had been prematurely
given the case because no decision had yet been made by a court as to
whether the estate in question had become entitled to Mr. Brink's life
insurance policy before or after the Interim Constitution came into
force.72 He nevertheless dealt with the case under the direct access
procedure because the application to the Constitutional Court had
been made in March, 1995, before practitioners and other courts had
been given any guidance as to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Court (in Luitingh the application was made one month after judg-
ment had been given in Zuma).7" Direct access was also permitted in
68. 1996 (2) SALR 909 (CC).
69. See Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. VII, § 102(1).
70. This view had already been adopted in cases decided within the previous two
weeks or so. See Ferreira v. Levin, 1996 (2) SALR 621 (CC); Bernstein v. Bester, 1996
(2) SALR 751 (CC). On the latter case, see infra Parts IV(c) and V.
71. 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC).
72. Id. at 208-09.
73. Id. at 209. The Court in Brink went on to hold, with little difficulty, that sec-
tion 44 of the 1943 Act did breach the equality provision in section 8 of the Interim
Constitution and that the breach could not be upheld as an acceptable limitation
within the terms of section 33(1).
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Besserglik v. Minister of Trade, IndustrY and Tourisin,7 4 where Justice
O'Regan said that
the applicant's failure to follow the correct procedures may have
been influenced by the novelty of the Constitution and its proce-
dures. At this stage, the applicant has almost no further recourse
available to him. Should we refuse to hear his application for direct
access, it is unlikely that he will obtain relief elsewhere.75
In Gardener v. Whitaker,76 the Court reverted to its stance in Lii-
tingh and refused to deal with the substantive issue involved, which
was whether the Interim Constitution's provisions on fundamental
rights affected the common law action of defamation. Justice Ken-
tridge, for the Court, held that the action in the Provincial Division of
the Eastern Cape raised issues other than constitutional ones, and that
therefore the application for leave to appeal should go to the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court and not to the Constitutional
Court.77 Likewise, in Tsotetsi v. Mutual and Federal Insurance Co.,
the Constitutional Court remitted a case to the Transvaal Provincial
Division on the basis that the issue 79 was not decisive for the current
case because the accident in which the applicant had been injured had
occurred before the Interim Constitution came into force.'" In Trans-
vaal Agricultural Union v. Minister of Land Affairs,81 an application
for direct access concerning the validity of provisions in the Restitu-
tion of Land Rights Act of 1994 was dismissed because there was not
yet any "case" in which the question was decisive. This last decision
was followed in Motsepe v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue,83 where
the Court rejected a reference from the Transvaal Provincial Division
seeking a ruling on the constitutionality of certain provisions in the
Income Tax Act of 1962.8 The Court stated that whatever ruling it
would give on this matter would not affect the legitimacy of the se-
questration proceedings being brought against the applicant by the
Commissioner. The Court further held that direct access be not
74. 1996 (4) SALR 331 (CC) (concerning the constitutionality of section 20(4)(b)
of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, which requires leave for any civil appeal to the
Appellate Division).
75. Id at 334.
76. 1996 (4) SALR 337 (CC).
77. Id. at 346.
78. 1997 (1) SALR 585 (CC).
79. The issue raised focused on whether provisions in the Multilateral Vehicle Ac-
cidents Act of 1989 were in breach of § 8 of the Interim Constitution (the equality
clause), because they limited the damages payable to certain classes of persons in-
jured in motor vehicle accidents.
80. Tsotetsi, 1997 (1) SALR at 590.
81. 1997 (2) SALR 621 (CC).
82. Id. at 630.
83. 1997 (2) SALR 898 (CC).
84. Id. at 912.
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granted because the applicant could have followed the objection and
appeal procedures provided for in the Act itself.85
The Court again ruled on the availability of direct access in S v.
Bequinot,86 a case which also contains very significant remarks on
when a reference to the Court is justifiable in a criminal case. In Be-
quinot, the appellant had been convicted in a magistrate's court of
receiving stolen property under section 37 of the General Law
Amendment Act 62 of 1955. That section provides that a person ac-
cused of this offense has the onus of proving that he or she had rea-
sonable grounds for believing that the goods were not stolen. The
appellant appealed to the Witwatersrand Local Division of the
Supreme Court, but did not raise the constitutionality of section 37; it
was the judges themselves who, of their own motion, decided to refer
the constitutionality issue to the Constitutional Court. Obviously
wishing to avoid a flood of references, the Court stressed that issues
should be referred to it only if they were vital to the determination of
the case: it was not in the interest of justice for the Court to consider
cases in abstracto. In the words of Justice Kriegler:
There are sound policy reasons why constitutional questions should
not be anticipated .... A referral at the appropriate juncture,
where the constitutional issue is vital to the determination of the
case and has been thoroughly canvassed in one or more of the
courts, serves to define the constitutional issues and focus the devel-
opment of our constitutional jurisprudence. But a case such as this,
where the parties did not raise the issues themselves and the consti-
tutional point may well prove peripheral, is inappropriate for grap-
pling with the difficult legal and policy issues involved in
invalidating a long-standing weapon in society's war against crime. 87
Many decisions to date on direct access are confusing and difficult
to reconcile. Of the eleven cases in point, the Court permitted direct
access in five and disallowed it in the other six. It must have been
very difficult for the lawyers involved in these cases to predict how
each would go, and even now the applicable criteria are none too defi-
nite. What is required in this area is a reformed set of Court Rules
which set out clearly and rationally the criteria that will be applied by
the Constitutional Court when deciding whether or not to accede to a
request for direct access. Accession should, it is submitted, remain
wholly exceptional. At present, the Court risks bringing itself into dis-
repute if, on the one hand, it chastises applicants for misconstruing the
Constitution's provisions on the Court's appellate and referral juris-
85. Id. The Court added that in any event the applicant's counsel had made no
formal application for direct access as required by Constitutional Court Rule 17. Id. at
909.
86. 1997 (2) SALR 887 (CC).
87. Id. at 896.
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diction and yet, on the other, proceeds to hear applications under the
direct access provisions.
B. When Does the Bill of Rights Operate Retrospectively?
One of the most divisive issues, procedural or substantive, to have
confronted the Constitutional Court so far has been whether the fun-
damental rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are to be enjoyed by
persons involved in court proceedings that were pending when the In-
terim Constitution came into effect on April 27, 1994. In Mhingu,
seven justices decided that the individuals involved in proceedings
pre-dating the implementation of the Constitution are still guaranteed
these fundamental rights; however, four justices claimed that these in-
dividuals were not entitled to these protections. Although it is not
possible to detect racial or sexual fault-lines in the reasoning of the
judgments rendered, it is worth noting that the four dissenters were all
white males. They adopted a traditionally literal approach to the in-
terpretation of the Constitution, justifying this by saying that some-
times the wording of a law is just too plain to allow for any meaning
other than the obvious.89 The majority, nevertheless, adopted a more
imaginative approach. In Justice Sachs' words, the challenge was "to
seek out the essential purposes and interest to be served by the two
competing sets of provisions, and then, using a species of proportion-
ality, balance them against each other."'9u He added: "Practical
problems can always be dealt with in a practical way. Rights are of a
different order, and it is our duty to uphold them wherever
possible."'"
In four subsequent decisions, however, the Constitution has been
held not to have a retrospective effect.92 In Du Plessis v. De Klerk,93
the Court held that a newspaper could not rely upon section 15 of the
Constitution-conferring the right to freedom of expression-as a de-
fense against a defamation action launched by plaintiffs prior to April,
1994.9' The majority of the Court did, however, leave open the possi-
bility that in some circumstances of gross injustice the human rights
88. S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867 (CC).
89. Id. at 901-02 (Kentridge, J., dissenting); see Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const.,
supra note 5, ch. XV, § 241(8).
90. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR at 914-15 (Sachs, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 920.
92. See also Zantsi v. Council of State, Ciskei, 1995 (4) SALR 615 (CC). There
the issue was whether local and provincial divisions of the Supreme Court could in-
quire into the constitutionality of Acts passed prior to April 1994. The Constitutional
Court did not think that that was an issue of sufficiently compelling interest to justify
a reference to itself under section 102(8), but it concluded in any event that the lower
courts did not have the power in question.
93. 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
94. Id at 884-85.
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provisions might apply retrospectivelyY Likewise, in Key v. Attorney-
General, Cape Provincial Division,96 where Mr. Key complained that
the search and seizure of documents at his home, conducted under the
Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act of 1991, breached the
Constitution, the Court held that no use could be made of the Consti-
tution in relation to events occurring wholly before April 27, 1994.97
Again, though, the Court, through Justice Kriegler, was unwilling to
lay down a blanket rule; instead, it found that the way in which evi-
dence had been obtained could affect the fairness of a trial, guaran-
teed by section 25(3) of the Constitution.98
It seems, therefore, that the Constitutional Court is generally reluc-
tant to give the human rights provisions of the South African Consti-
tution any retrospective effect. Only in exceptional circumstances will
a departure from that rule be contemplated. Of course, as time
elapses, the likelihood of a case arising out of facts occurring prior to
April, 1994, when the first set of human rights provisions came into
force, will gradually diminish.
C. Can the Bill of Rights Have Any Horizontal Effects?
When drafts of the Interim Constitution were being discussed, and
even after it came into force, one of the issues most fervently disputed
was whether Chapter 3 should operate not just vertically, so as to al-
low private companies and individuals to claim rights against organs
of the state, but also horizontally, so as to allow private companies
and individuals to claim rights against one another. Most of the word-
ing of Chapter 3 tends to favor the view that it operates only verti-
cally,99 but some of the provisions are open to the opposite
interpretation. For instance, section 7(4) says that when a person al-
leges that a Chapter 3 right has been infringed, he or she is entitled to
apply to a court for relief, and nothing expressly limits this entitlement
to situations where the infringement is by an organ of the state.'00
95. Id. at 887. The case also raised the question of the Constitution's horizontal
effects. For a discussion of the Constitution's horizontal effects, see infra Part IV(C).
96. 1996 (4) SALR 187 (CC).
97. Id. at 192; see also Rudolph v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 1996 (4)
SALR 552 (CC) (reaching the same conclusion under comparable facts, where a
search had been conducted under the Income Tax Act of 1962).
98. Key, 1996 (4) SALR at 195. In Ynuico Ltd. v. Minister of Trade and Industry,
1996 (3) SALR 989 (CC), a case that did not deal with any of the human rights provi-
sions as such, the applicant alleged that the Minister's refusal in 1988 to grant him an
import license for tea breached section 37 of the Constitution, which vests the legisla-
tive authority of the Republic in Parliament, not a Minister. Justice Didcott, for the
Court, brushed aside this argument by saying that section 37 had no bearing on the
matter since it dealt with legislative power only from the time the Constitution began
to operate.
99. This is particularly true of section 7(1) which provides: "This Chapter shall
bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of government." Republic
of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 7(1).
100. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 7(4).
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Section 35(3) says that when a court is interpreting an, law, it must
have "due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter."101
Moreover section 33(3) makes it clear that other rights or freedoms
are to be recognized in South African law only if they are consistent
with the rights described in Chapter 3.102
The Constitutional Court had occasion to rule on this issue in two
cases decided in May, 1996, both concerned with defamation: Du
Plessis v. De Klerk'013 and Gardener v. Whitaker." In principle, the
Court declared, Chapter 3 does not have a horizontal effect on the
common law applying between private individuals or companies, and
section 15, which confers the right to freedom of expression, certainly
does not.105 But the Court refused to rule out the applicability of all
provisions of Chapter 3 in all situations arising between private indi-
viduals or companies. Likewise, in Bernstein v. Bester, 11 Justice Ack-
ermann refused to be drawn into the debate about whether the
Interim Constitution imported rights horizontally, but he strongly sug-
gested that the Interim Constitution had deliberately not constitution-
alized civil procedure.1 0 7 It is likely that this matter will come before
the Court on future occasions, if only because the 1996 Constitution is
much more explicit in its extension of fundamental rights to the pri-
vate sphere. 08 This is in line with developments elsewhere,1° 9 though
it runs counter to the approach preferred by the Canadian Supreme
Court.i x0
V. Tim CouRT's SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS AFFECTING HUMAN
RiGHrs
As shown earlier, under the Interim Constitution, but not under the
1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court obtained exclusive power
to strike down "any law" '' on the grounds that it violated constitu-
tional provisions, including provisions concerning fundamental rights
contained in the Bill of Rights. Of the first forty-eight cases decided
101. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5. ch. III, § 35(3).
102. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 33(3).
103. 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
104. 1996 (4) SALR 337 (CC).
105. This follows the restrictive approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada
in relation to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep't
Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. [1986] D.LR. 174.
106. 1996 (2) SALR 751 (CC). See infra Part V.
107. Bester, 1996 (2) SALR at 803.
108. See supra Part 1II.
109. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (1993) (sur-
veying the application of human rights in the sphere of relations between non-state
bodies in various countries).
110. Retail Wholesale and Dep't Store Union, Local 580 [1986], D.L.R. at 198-99.
111. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5. ch. VII, § 9S(2)(c).
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by the Court and surveyed for this article,1 2 twenty-six required a
decision on whether existing law violated any of the human rights pro-
visions.'13 In sixteen of these twenty-six cases a law was invali-
dated." 4 Usually the invalidity was ordered to apply from the date
the Interim Constitution came into force (April 27, 1994), but on one
or two occasions it was extended to cover actions performed before
that date'15 or, in contrast, postponed until a stipulated date in the
future.' 16
To facilitate matters, the Court has devised a straightforward two-
stage test for determining whether a law should be declared invalid.
The first stage involves asking whether a violated right is a right pro-
tected by the Constitution. The Court has made it clear that, when it
interprets rights protected by the Constitution, it will take a broad
view, as in both Canadian constitutional jurisprudence and the juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The second stage,
which applies only if the violated right is protected, involves asking
whether the alleged violation constitutes a permissible limitation of
the right in question. The Court has said that the onus of showing
whether this type of alleged violation is a permissible limitation rests
upon the party relying on the violating legislation. Again, this second
stage test is reminiscent of the approach adopted in Canada and in the
European Court of Human Rights. Because the United States Consti-
tution does not contain a limitation clause comparable to those in the
South African Constitution, the Canadian Charter, or the European
Convention, American courts must instead fine-tune the law by giving
ever more particular definitions of the rights in question.
Probably the best known of the substantive decisions of the South
African Constitutional Court affecting human rights are S v.
112. A chronological list of all cases (and much other useful information) is avail-
able from the website of the Faculty of Law at the University of Witwatersrand, Wits
Law School: Decisions of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (visited Sept. 27,
1997) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/html>.
113. The other 22 cases concerned procedural issues only-as defined in Part IV of
this article-or were challenges against drafts of proposed legislation or proposed na-
tional or provincial constitutions; one case dealt only with the allocation of costs.
114. In brief those sixteen cases, in chronological order, are: S v. Zuma, 1995 (2)
SALR 642 (CC), S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC), S v. Mhungu, 1995 (3)
SALR 867 (CC), S v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC), Coetzee v. Government of
the Republic of S. Afr., 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC), S v. Bhulwana, 1996 (1) SALR 388
(CC), Shabalala v. Attorney-General, Transvaal, 1996 (1) SALR 725 (CC), Ferreira v.
Levin, 1996 (1) SALR 984 (CC), S v. Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR 1207 (CC), Curtis v. Minis-
ter of Safety & Sec., 1996 (3) SALR 617 (CC), Brink v. Kitshoff NO, 1996 (4) SALR
197 (CC), S v. Julies, 1996 (4) SALR 313 (CC), Scagell v. Attorney-General, Western
Cape, 1996 (11) BCLR 1446 (SA), Mohlomi v. Minister of Defence, 1997 (1) SALR
124 (CC), Fraser v. Children's Court, Pretoria N., 1997 (2) SALR 261 (CC), and S v.
Coetzee, 1997 (4) BCLR 437 (SA). Only Shabalala involved the invalidity of a com-
mon law rather than a legislative rule.
115. Mohlomi, 1997 (1) SALR 124; Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867.
116. Fraser, 1997 (2) SALR 261; Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR 1207.
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Makwanyane,117 where the death penalty was declared unconstitu-
tional, and S v. Williams,1 8 where whipping of juveniles was likewise
condemned as unconstitutional." 9 The death penalty case was the
first to be given an oral hearing by the Court, and the decision was
keenly awaited throughout the country. There had been no hangings
since November, 1989, but during much of the preceding apartheid
era there had been more than one-hundred every year. When the
Constitutional Court's decision was finally announced more than
three months after the hearing, no one was really surprised that the
judges were unanimously opposed to the death penalty, but the result
was still roundly criticized in many quarters as being out of touch with
the wishes of the majority of the population. The fact that 459 prison-
ers on death row were to be reprieved did not go down well with the
media, and perhaps in anticipation of this reaction, the Court stressed
in its final order that all such prisoners were to remain in custody until
the death sentences imposed on them had been set aside in accord-
ance with the law and alternative punishments substituted.
Uniquely, all eleven judges issued a judgment in this case. They
unanimously held that the death penalty, provided for by section
277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, was inconsistent
with the right to life under section 9 of the Interim Constitution,120 the
right to dignity under section 10,121 and the right not to be subjected
to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment under section 11(2).122 It
was not justifiable in terms of the limitation provision-section
33(1)-because no study proved it to be a deterrent, and retribution
per se could not outweigh the right to life. President Chaskalson was
particularly eloquent in explaining the process the Court must go
through when applying section 33(1). After stating that section 33(1)
requires the weighing of competing values and ultimately an assess-
ment based on proportionality-a test which he said was used in some
form in Canada, Germany, the United States and by the European
Court of Human Rights, and which calls for a balancing of interests-
he continued:
In the balancing process the relevant considerations will include the
nature of the right that is limited and its importance to an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for
which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to
such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particu-
larly where the limitation has to be necessary [as required in certain
117. 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
118. 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC).
119. For a comment on both cases, see Jeremy Sarkin, Problems and Challenges
Facing South Africa's Constitutional Court: An Evaltation of its Decisions on Capital
and Corporal Punishment, 113 S. Afr. LJ. 71 (1996).
120. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 429.
121. Id. at 422.
122. Id. at 433.
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instances by section 33(1)], whether the desired ends could reason-
ably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in
question.' 2 3
The judges in Makwanyane were happy to consult the reports of the
technical committees which had advised the Multi-Party Negotiating
Process while the Interim Constitution was being drafted, but in fact
those travaux prdparatoires revealed that the negotiators had not re-
solved the issue of whether the death penalty should be permitted or
not. Interestingly, four of the justices supported their conclusion by
citing the need to promote "ubuntu,' 11 4 one of the values mentioned
in the Interim Constitution under the provisions following section 251
entitled "National Unity and Reconciliation." There was also exten-
sive reference made to foreign case law, it being noted, for example,
that the Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe,
and the Privy Council in relation to Jamaica, had all held the death
penalty constitutional, but that the European Court of Human Rights
had held that extraditing someone to the United States, where there
would be a long wait on death-row, was inhuman and degrading treat-
ment.1 25 Less attention was given to United States Supreme Court
decisions, which grant considerable leeway to the individual states to
impose a death penalty if they so prefer. 2 6 It may be that the Consti-
tutional Court will have occasion to revisit this issue in the not too
distant future, because the ANC is now reviewing its opposition to the
death penalty in light of rising murder rates in South Africa.' 27
In Williams, where only one judgment was issued, the Court found
that provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, authorizing the
whipping of juveniles-in practice persons aged between nine and
twenty-were inconsistent with sections 10 and 11(2) of the Constitu-
tion-the sections guaranteeing respect for and protection of a per-
son's dignity and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. 2 ' In so holding, the Court cited
similar findings from courts around the world, including Strasbourg,12 9
the United States, Canada, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, though it recog-
nized that the neighboring jurisdictions of Lesotho and Botswana still
tolerated the practice. Justice Langa stressed that the Court had al-
123. Id. at 436.
124. "Ubuntu" is apparently a Zulu word connoting reconciliation.
125. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 425-26. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 14038/88 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (Commission report).
126. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (stating that in assessing a
punishment enacted by a democratically elected legislature, constitutionality is pre-
sumed valid).
127. Indigo Gilmore, ANC Forced to Consider Return of the Gallows, London
Times, Sept. 2, 1996, at 8.
128. S v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC).
129. E.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978) (Court report)
(dealing with the mistreatment of terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland); Tyrer v.
United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1 (1978) (relating to birching on the Isle of Man).
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ready held 3 ' that when Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution was
interpreted a purposive approach should be adopted.13 1 Given that
the political negotiations resulting in the drafting of the Interim Con-
stitution had been based on a rejection of violence, there could be no
doubt that institutionalized violence by the state against juvenile of-
fenders would run counter to the values underlying the Constitution.
Coupled with its two stage approach to Chapter 3, and consistent
with its strictures on the legitimacy of references and of requests for
direct access,132 the Constitutional Court has adopted a restrictive atti-
tude to the framing of questions referred to it. In Shabalala v. Attor-
ney-General, Transvaal,133 Deputy President Mahomed for the Court
chose to rephrase the three questions posed in the reference. He said
that the first question-whether a court interpreting the Constitution
was bound by the principles of stare decisis to follow the decision of a
superior court-should not have been referred at all because that con-
cerned an issue of interpretation of the common law, not of the Con-
stitution. The second and third questions, he added, were too widely
framed. The Court would consider whether the privilege attaching
under South African common law to the contents of police files
(known as "dockets" in South Africa) was consistent with the Consti-
tution, but not the precise circumstances in which access to those
dockets would be allowed. Similarly, the Court would consider
whether the common law's prohibition on accused persons or their
legal representatives consulting with prosecution witnesses without
the consent of the prosecuting authority was consistent with the Con-
stitution, but not the precise circumstances in which such consulta-
tions should be allowed. 34
On both these questions, the Constitutional Court held that the
common law rules were inconsistent with the Constitution, in particu-
lar with section 25(3), which gives to every accused person the right to
a fair trial.' 35 This was principally because the common law rules were
too all-embracing, and hence they were impossible to uphold in terms
of section 33(1) of the Constitution as necessary, reasonable, and justi-
fiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equal-
ity. The Court was not prepared to substitute one blanket rule for
another, but in its order it carefully outlined some guidelines as to
how requests for access to police dockets or consultations with prose-
cution witnesses should be dealt with by the courts in each case. The
courts, said Deputy President Mahomed, retain discretion in these
130. The Court had held in S v. Zuna, 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC), and S v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC), that Chapter 3 was intended to have signifi-
cant meaning.
131. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR at 649.
132. See supra Part IV(A).
133. 1996 (1) SALR 725 (CC).
134. I. at 755-56.
135. Id. at 756-57.
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matters.136 Shabalala is thus an important case: It illustrates the im-
pact of the constitutional human rights provisions on the common law,
and it demonstrates how the Constitutional Court can provide gui-
dance to legislators charged with correcting that law, even if the de-
tails must always be left to Parliament.
An understandable reluctance to be categorical was also evident in
Coetzee v. Government of Republic of South Africa,137 a decision on
the constitutionality of imprisonment for debt (provided for by the
Magistrate's Courts Act of 1944). The applicants challenged their im-
prisonment as being contrary to section 11(1) of the Interim Constitu-
tion, the right not to be detained without trial, and section 25(3), the
right to a fair trial. Holding in their favor, the Court listed as many as
eight reasons why the provisions in question were not justifiable under
section 33 of the Constitution-e.g., the person imprisoned may not
even know that he or she is a debtor-but no judge was prepared to
rule out imprisonment for debt in every conceivable case. 138 Justice
Sachs came nearest to doing so, but even he shied away. He did,
though, provide eloquent guidance on how the phrase "open and
democratic society" in section 33 should be interpreted.139 He said
that it was "not merely aspirational or decorative" but "normative,
furnishing the matrix of ideals within which we work."' 40 He also
said, "[W]e should not engage in purely formal or academic analysis,
not simply restrict ourselves to ad hoc technicism, but rather focus on
what has been called the synergetic relation between the values un-
derlying the guarantees of fundamental rights and the circumstances
of the particular case.' 14 1
Criminal procedure was again at issue in S v. Bhulwana and S v.
Gwadiso,'142 two cases concerned with the constitutionality of a statu-
tory provision which provided that a defendant found in possession of
more than 115 grams of cannabis, sometimes called "dagga" in South
Africa, was presumed, until the contrary was proved, to be dealing the
drug. The cases were therefore comparable to Zuma in that they in-
volved the constitutionality of a statutory presumption of guilt.
Applying its two-stage approach, the Court held in its threshold in-
quiry that the provision was contrary to the presumption of innocence
guaranteed to accused persons by section 25(3)(c) of the Interim Con-
stitution. Secondly, the presumption could not be upheld under sec-
tion 33(1). Justice O'Regan, for the Court, dismissed the possibility of
"reading down" the provision so as to give it a more restricted, and
136. Id. at 756.
137. 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC).
138. Id. at 643-45.
139. Id. at 659-61 (Sachs, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 656.
141. Id.
142. 1996 (1) SALR 388 (CC).
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constitutionally valid, interpretation. 4 3 She said this would entail
reading "until the contrary is proved" as "unless the evidence raises a
reasonable doubt," thereby substituting an evidential burden of proof
for the legal burden." She continued that the words were not rea-
sonably capable of bearing such an interpretation, given both their
lack of ambiguity and the previously consistent judicial interpretation
of the phrase. 4 5 The same reasoning was employed by Justice
Kriegler, for the Court, in a case with very similar facts that arose
under a comparable paragraph in the same Act, S v. Julies,t46 and by
Justice O'Regan again, for the Court, in Scagell v. Attorney-General,
Western Cape,4 7 where the presumptions raised by sections 6(3) and
(4) of the Gambling Act of 1965 were declared unconstitutional.
In another case involving a statutory presumption of guilt, the
Court expressed itself more fully on the right to silence: S v.
Mbatha,'4 where the provision under scrutiny was section 40(1) of the
Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969. According to this provision, if a
person was being prosecuted for possession of arms or ammunition,
and it was proved that the item was at any time on or in any premises
or vehicle, then any person who at that time was on or in charge of
such premises or vehicle was presumed to have been in possession of
the item unless the contrary was proved. The state's chief argument in
favor of retaining this presumption was that it assisted in combating
the escalating levels of crime, thereby helping the government to ful-
fill its duty to protect society generally. Moreover, the state argued
that detection of people in possession of illegal arms and ammunition
was often extremely difficult, and that without the presumption, the
prosecution would have great difficulty in proving both the mental
and physical elements of possession. Justice Langa, again for the
Court, said that he sympathized with the law enforcers' problem, but
that the measure taken was not "fashioned in accordance with the
specifications permitted by the Constitution."'4 9 He concluded that
the presumption was couched in terms that were too wide, that its
application did not depend on a logical or rational connection be-
tween the assumed fact and the basic facts proved, and that it gave
immense discretionary power to the police and the prosecuting au-
thorities as to whether or not to proceed with arrest and indictment.
Surprisingly, Justice Langa went on to suggest that an acceptable
alternative to section 40(1) might be a provision casting an evidential
burden on the defense. He continued:
143. Id. at 397-98.
144. Id. at 398.
145. Id
146. 1996 (4) SALR 313 (CC) (dealing with section 21(1)(a)(iii) of the Drugs and
Drug Trafficking Act of 1992).
147. 1996 (11) BCLR (SA) 1446.
148. 1996 (2) SALR 464 (CC); see supra Part IV.
149. Mbatha, 1996 (2) SALR at 475.
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That it might impact on the right of an accused person to remain
silent is true; but on the assumption that the rampant criminal abuse
of lethal weapons in many parts of our country would justify some
measured re-thinking about time-honoured rules and procedures,
some limitation on the right to silence might be more defensible
than the present one on the presumption of innocence. 150
In support of his view, Justice Langa did not cite recent reforms to
Northern Irish 151 or English law'52 on the right to silence, but he
might well have done so. The framers of the 1996 Constitution do not
seem to have heeded Langa's views, however, for section 35(3) now
explicitly states that every accused person has both the right to si-
lence 153 and the right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating
evidence.154
In fact, the constitutionality of the right to silence had already come
before the Court in Ferreira v. Levin, 55 decided two months before
Mbatha. It was in the context of a challenge to section 417(2A)(b) of
the Companies Act of 1973, as amended, which refers to persons sum-
moned to provide evidence in winding-up proceedings, and says that
such persons may be required to answer questions put to them,
notwithstanding that the answer might tend to incriminate them.
Eight of the ten judges in the case held that a right against self-incrim-
ination, while not expressly mentioned in the Interim Constitution, is
implicit in the fair trial provisions of section 25(3). 156 This means that
the South African Constitutional Court has now recognized
"unenumerated" rights in the Constitution, just like the Supreme
Courts of the United States and Ireland before it. The other two
judges, Justices Ackermann and Sachs, preferred to strike down the
provision in question because of its inconsistency with section 11 (1) of
the Interim Constitution, which guaranteed the freedom and security
of the person.' 57 It is interesting that the European Court of Human
Rights has recently held against the United Kingdom in a case with
similar facts. 158
There are two further decisions of the Constitutional Court relating
to the right to silence. In Bernstein v. Bester,159 the challenge was to
the whole scheme of sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act of
1973, which deal with winding-up examinations. The applicants al-
150. Id. at 479.
151. Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988.
152. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, §§ 34-39 (Eng.).
153. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 35(3)(h).
154. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 35(3)6).
155. 1996 (1) SALR 984 (CC).
156. Id. at 1090-92.
157. Id. at 1020-22 (Ackermann, J., dissenting).
158. Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313
(1997) (Commission report).
159. 1996 (2) SALR 751 (CC).
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leged a breach of section 8 of the Interim Constitution (the guarantee
of equality), section 11(1) (the right to freedom and security of the
person), section 13 (the right to personal privacy), section 24 (the right
to procedurally fair administrative action), and section 25(3) (the right
to a fair trial). On all grounds, except the last, which had already been
considered in Ferreira v. Levin, 60 they failed. Justice Ackermann
gave the main, extremely learned judgment, where he supported his
conclusions by referring to decisions reached in several other jurisdic-
tions, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the United
States, and Germany.' 6 ' He also cited the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. 162 Regarding the challenge based on
section 11(1), he was prepared to accept the majority view of that sub-
section expressed in Ferreira with which he and Justice Sachs previ-
ously disagreed, and about which Justice O'Regan had stated no
opinion, though he did say he would have reached the same conclu-
sion had he maintained his own view propounded in the earlier case.
He also made the important point that care must be taken when at-
tempting to project common law principles onto the interpretation of
fundamental rights and their limitation, or indeed principles derived
from the United States or Germany, because South African constitu-
tional law, like that of Canada, now requires a two-stage approach
when deciding the constitutionality of a provision.'113 In Ferreira, the
Court had left open the question of whether it was constitutional to
use an examinee's answers in civil proceedings against the examinee;
in Bester,164 the Court held that it was.
A related issue arose in Nel v. Le Roux, tb5 where the Court had to
rule on the constitutionality of section 205 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, the section which, when read together with section 189 of the
same Act,166 permitted the imprisonment of a person who, having
been called to give evidence in criminal proceedings, refused to an-
swer any question put to him or her. The applicant was complaining
that if he answered the questions foreshadowed in the subpoena re-
quiring him to appear in connection with charges being brought
against another individual for fraud, he risked exposing himself to the
civil forfeitures provided for in the Exchange Control Regulations.
The allegation was that this breached sections 8(1), 11(1), 11(2), 13,
15(1), 23, 24 and 25(3)(a), (c) and (d) of the Interim Constitution.
160. 1996 (1) SALR 984 (CC).
161. Bester, 1996 (2) SALR at 767-806.
162. Id at 791.
163. Id. at 792.
164. Id at 802.
165. 1996 (3) SALR 562 (CC).
166. The Court lamented the fact that the referral from the Witwatersrand Local
Division of the Supreme Court had, somewhat carelessly, not mentioned section 189.
This could have led to real difficulties if the Constitutional Court had decided that
section 205 was unconstitutional, for what status would section 189 then have had?
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Justice Ackermann, on behalf of the Court, rejected this argument.
As in Bester, he was able to show that the law already allows someone
such as the applicant a "just excuse" for refusing to answer ques-
tions.1 67 He added, though, that any compulsion to answer is permis-
sible only if it was justifiable under section 33(1) of the Constitution.
Such compulsion was conceivable on the facts of particular cases, as
was acknowledged in other legal systems, including the United States
and Germany.168
The presumption of innocence was again at issue in S v. Coetzee.169
The applicant first challenged section 245 of the Criminal Procedure
Act of 1977, which provides that where an accused person is charged
with an offense of which a false representation is an element, and it is
proved that the false representation was made by the accused, he or
she must be deemed to have made the representation knowing it to be
false unless the contrary is proved. The Court unanimously struck
down this provision, holding that it could not be "saved" by the limita-
tion clause in the Interim Constitution170 merely on the basis that the
prosecution would otherwise find it difficult to prove an essential ele-
ment of the offense. The applicant's challenge to another provision in
the same Act, section 332(5), was much more controversial. Seven of
the judges upheld it and four dissented. The subsection provides that
a servant or director of a company that has committed an offense is
deemed guilty of that offense unless he or she can show on a balance
of probabilities that he or she had no personal involvement in the of-
fense and could not have prevented it. The majority focused on the
unacceptable breadth of the provision and felt that there were other
means, consistent with the Bill of Rights, by which the law could en-
sure that the affairs of companies are conducted properly.1 71 The mi-
nority thought that the provision was a justifiable limitation of the
right to be presumed innocent enshrined in section 25(3)(c) of the In-
terim Constitution. 72 On this occasion, the Court certainly did not
split on racial grounds, but both female judges were among the dis-
senting voices.
The most recent decision on the presumption of innocence is Prin-
sloo v. Van der Linde,173 where the issue arose in a civil rather than a
criminal context. Section 84 of the Forest Act of 1984 presumes negli-
167. Nel, 1996 (3) SALR at 576-77.
168. As in Bester, Justice Ackermann showed his predilection for citing decisions of
the German Federal Constitutional Court.
169. 1997 (4) BCLR 437 (SA).
170. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 33(1).
171. The majority consisted of Chaskalson, Mahomed, Didcott, Langa, Kriegler,
Ackermann, and Sachs. The main judgment was given by Justice Langa; Ackermann
and Sachs came to the same conclusions but by a different route.
172. The minority consisted of Kentridge, O'Regan, Mokgoro, and Madala.
173. The decision in this case was rendered on April 18, 1997, and, as of the time of
this article, was unreported. It is available on the Internet. Faculty of Law at the
University of Witwatersrand, Wits Law School: Decisions of the Constitutional Court
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gence on the part of a landowner if a fire starts on his or her land and
spreads to neighboring land. The Court unanimously rejected the ap-
plicant's challenge to section 84. It failed the first stage of the two
stage test because the right in question was not one recognized by the
Interim Constitution, section 25(3)(c) 17 4 being confined to criminal
cases. 75 The Court also rejected a further ground of alleged invalidity
of section 84, namely the "discrimination" against defendants in fire
cases, as opposed to those in other cases of delict, and against land-
owners living outside fire control areas, as opposed to those living
within them. Unsurprisingly, the Court had little difficulty in holding
that any inequality of treatment or discrimination in this case was jus-
tifiable within the terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Interim Con-
stitution, primarily because the core of those provisions, the
protection of a person's dignity, was not in question here.
In S v. Ntul14 7 6 the matter at issue was the constitutionality of sec-
tion 309(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. That paragraph
provides, in effect, that a person who has been convicted in a magis-
trate's court and who is in prison for that offense, shall not be entitled
to proceed with an appeal in person-i.e., without a lawyer-unless a
judge of the provincial or local division certifies that there are reason-
able grounds for the appeal.'" Mr. Ntuli, having been convicted by a
magistrate of rape, attempted murder, and assault wvith intent to do
grievous bodily harm, applied to a judge of the Witwatersrand Local
Division for such a certificate. The acting judge on that case sus-
pended the application while he referred the constitutionality of sec-
tion 309(4)(a) to the Constitutional Court under section 102(1) of the
Constitution.'78 Justice Didcott, for the Court, branded section
309(4)(a) unconstitutional, because it violated section 25(3)(h) and
section 8(1). 17 9 The former guarantees to accused persons who have
been tried the right "to have recourse by way of appeal or review to a
higher court than the court of first instance, "" while the latter dic-
tates that "[e]very person shall have the right to equality before the
of South Africa (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http'iwww.law.wits.ac.za/judgementsi
prinsloo.html>.
174. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. Ill, § 25(3)(c).
175. The 1996 Constitution seems similarly confined, talking as it does of l[elvery
accused." Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 35(3).
176. 1996 (1) SALR 1207 (CC).
177. The Court was informed that during the three year period between 1992 and
1994 more than 8,000 applications for judge's certificates were received and almost
7,000 were rejected. Id at 1216.
178. Id. at 1210. Perhaps strangely, the Constitutional Court found no fault with
Justice Cloete's course of action, even though he did not, as counselled by Justice
Kentridge's preferred "general principle" enunciated in S v. Mhhngu, 1995 (3) SALR
867 (CC), fully resolve the issue in front of him before referring it.
179. Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR at 1216-17.
180. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. 111, § 25(3)(h).
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law." '81 Having analyzed exactly what is involved in the certificate
procedure of the judge under section 309(4)(a), and finding that deci-
sions sometimes are made without reading the full record of the mag-
istrate's hearing, Didcott refused to characterise it as "recourse by
way of appeal or review." ' Section 8(1) was violated because the
certificate procedure does not apply to prisoners who are legally rep-
resented in their appeals or to convicted persons who are not in
prison. Nor could section 309(4)(a) be saved under section 33(1), be-
cause the violation in question was neither reasonable nor justifiable
in a society based on equality.
What is remarkable about Ntuli, however, is that the Court did not
strike down section 309(4)(a). Instead, persuaded that abolition of
the judge's certificate procedure would result in a substantial swelling
of the number of appeals, the Court exercised its discretion under the
proviso in section 98(5) of the Interim Constitution to suspend the
order of invalidity so that Parliament would have time to devise a
means for dealing with the increased number of appeals. The declara-
tion of invalidity was suspended until April 30, 1997-some sixteen
months later-or until the defect was remedied if that was earlier. In
fact, the Minister of Justice later discovered that he was not able to
meet this deadline and therefore applied for an extension of the pe-
riod until the end of 1998. In a subsequent judgment, the Court gave
the Minister no quarter: President Chaskalson found that the Minis-
ter's officials had failed to act promptly and diligently and that the
order of invalidity must therefore stand. 18 3
A few weeks after its decision in Ntudi, the Constitutional Court
issued its decision in the comparable case of S v. Rens. 4 There, the
question was whether the requirement in section 316 of the Criminal
Procedure Act of 1977, whereby persons convicted of an offense
before a superior court have to apply for leave to appeal against the
conviction or sentence, was unconstitutional. In Ntuli, Justice Didcott
had already outlined the similarities and differences between the
judge's certificate procedure with which he was there concerned and
the leave to appeal procedure under section 316. It came as no sur-
prise, then, when Justice Madala, on behalf of the Court, found sec-
tion 316 not to be inconsistent with section 25(3)(h) of the Interim
181. Republic of S. Afr. Interim Const., supra note 5, ch. III, § 8(1).
182. Ntuli, 1996 (1) SALR at 1214 ("That phrase sounds rather vague. But the mini-
mum that it envisages and implies, I believe, is the opportunity for an adequate reap-
praisal of every case and an informed decision on it. The statute makes no provision
for that opportunity.").
183. The case in reference is Minister of Justice v. Ntuli. The decision in this case
was rendered on June 5, 1997, and, as of the time of this article, was unreported. It is
available on the Internet. Faculty of Law at the University of Witwatersrand, Wits
Law School: Decisions of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (visited Sept. 27,
1997) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/ntuli97.html>.
184. 1996 (1) SALR 1218 (CC).
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Constitution. 85 As he did not discuss section 33(1), he presumably
felt that the challenge failed in linine, i.e., that the need to seek leave
for an appeal from a superior court was not itself a violation of the
right "to have recourse by way of appeal" or review to a higher court
or otherwise unfair.1' 6 He said that the judge's certificate procedure
dealt with in Ntuli was "materially different" and that "the underlying
purpose of the leave to appeal procedure-to protect the higher court
from the burden of having to deal wvith appeals in which there is no
prospect of success-is a legitimate and rational purpose.""t%7 He felt
strengthened in his conclusion by similar findings made with reference
to the European Convention on Human Rights."s
In Besserglik v. Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism,'"t' the ap-
plicant impugned section 20(4)(b) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959,
which sets as a precondition for the prosecution of a civil appeal the
leave of the provincial or local division against whose judgment an
appeal is sought or, if such leave should not be granted, the leave of
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Justice O'Regan, for
the Constitutional Court, had little difficulty in rejecting the applica-
tion. She held that "it cannot be said that a screening procedure
which excludes unmeritorious appeals is a denial of a right of access to
a court."'190
Turning to the right to freedom of expression, there have been two
notable decisions.'' In Case and Curtis v. Minister of Safety and Se-
curity,192 the applicants had been charged with contravening section 2
of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act of 1967 for pos-
session of sexually explicit video cassettes. The Court declared section
2 to be unconstitutional, although there was a difference in the reason-
ing employed to reach this end. Justice Mokgoro based her judgment
on section 15 of the Interim Constitution, the right to freedom of ex-
pression, 93 referring in the process to numerous authorities from
Canada and the United States, whereas Justices Didcott and Langa,
with whom seven other judges concurred, preferred to rely only on
185. Id. at 1225-27.
186. Id. at 1224-25.
187. Id. at 1226.
188. Id at 1225; see, e.g., Monnell and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9562/
81 and 9818/82 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 205, 222 (1987) (Commission report) (holding that
an appeal will not be granted unless there are legitimate grounds for appeal in law
which merit further consideration).
189. 1996 (4) SALR 331 (CC).
190. Id. at 335.
191. In addition, there is a very significant decision of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court: Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd., 1996 (2) SALR 588 (CC). See
Stuart Woolman, Defamation, Application and the Interim Constitution, 113 S. Afr.
LJ. 428 (1996).
192. 1996 (3) SALR 617 (CC).
193. Id. at 626-34 (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
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section 13, the right to privacy. 194 Justice Sachs relied on both provi-
sions.195 In J.T. Publishing v. Minister of Safety and Security,196 the
Court declined to consider the constitutionality of the Publications
Act of 1974, because in the interim it had been repealed and replaced.
The right to equality' 97 was under consideration in Brink v. Kitshoff
NO,198 where the issue was whether section 44 of the Insurance Act of
1943 was in conflict with the Constitution in so far as it discriminated
against married women. Justice O'Regan, dealing with the substance
of the matter, ruled that section 44 did unjustifiably breach the equal-
ity provision in section 8 of the Constitution.199 As to the appropriate
court order, O'Regan declared section 44 to be invalid from April 27,
1994, except to the extent that its operation had already resulted in
the transfer to a creditor or beneficiary of any money or asset which
would not otherwise have formed part of the deceased's estate since
that date. °° In Fraser v. Children's Court, Pretoria North,20 1 section 8
was again invoked to undermine section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care
Act of 1983, which requires a Children's Court to obtain the consent
of both parents before it can issue an order for the adoption of a legit-
imate child, but dispenses with the need to obtain a father's consent
for the adoption of his illegitimate child. The Constitutional Court,
through Deputy President Mahomed, did think that section 18
breached section 8, but it held that Parliament should be given two
years to decide how to change it; in the meantime section 18 is to
remain in force.
The rights of fathers were again under consideration in President of
the Republic of South Africa and Minister of Correctional Services v.
Hugo, 2 where a male prisoner was complaining that the President's
grant of early release from prison to mothers with children under the
age of twelve discriminated against him, a single father with a child
under twelve. The President's power in this context derived from sec-
tion 82(1)(k) of the Interim Constitution,0 3 not from an Act, so lower
194. Id. at 657-58.
195. Id. at 663 (Sachs, J., concurring).
196. The decision in this case was rendered on November 21, 1996, and, as of the
time of this article, was unreported. It is available on the Internet. Faculty of Law at
the University of Witwatersrand, Wits Law School. Decisions of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/
jtpub.html>.
197. See also supra note 172 (discussing Prinsloo's analysis of the right to equality).
198. 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC).
199. Brink, 1996 (4) SALR at 220.
200. Id. at 221.
201. 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (SA).
202. The decision in this case was rendered on April 18, 1997, and, as of the time of
this article, was unreported. It is available on the Internet. Faculty of Law at the
University of Witwatersrand, Wits Law School: Decisions of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/
hugo.html>.
203. Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 84(2)0).
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courts were entitled to measure the constitutionality of the exercise of
this power. The Durban and Coastal Local Division accordingly
struck down the grant of release, and the President and Minister ap-
pealed to the Constitutional Court. Nine judges upheld the grant of
release and two dissented.' ° As in Prinsloo v. Van der Linde, -, de-
cided by the Court on the same day, the majority focused on whether
the differentiation between mothers and fathers in the grant of release
fundamentally impaired the dignity and sense of equal worth of fa-
thers. They held that it did not, partly because early release is a privi-
lege, not a right, and partly because fathers could still apply separately
to the President for early release in their particular case. The general
test to be applied when determining whether discrimination is unfair,
said the Court, is whether the impact of it has been unfair, and that
means looking at the group which has been disadvantaged, the nature
of the power used, and the nature of the interest affected. Judges will
doubtless find the application of this test in future cases somewhat
problematic, but it is hard to see what more precise criteria could have
been laid down at this early stage in the Constitutional Court's
development.
The right of access to justice was at issue in AZAPO v. President of
the Republic of South Africa,20 6 where a complaint was lodged by rela-
tives of Steven Biko and other victims of security force brutality that
section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act 34 of 1995 was unconstitutional because, in permitting a Commit-
tee on Amnesty to grant amnesty to the perpetrator of an unlawful
act, it was depriving persons of their right under section 22 of the In-
terim Constitution to have disputes settled by a court of law or an-
other independent forum. In a politically charged decision, the Court
agreed that section 22 had been breached, but held that the breach
was justifiable under section 33(1) because the Afterword to the Con-
stitution-"National Unity and Reconciliation"-sanctioned the limi-
tation and the disputed amnesty was a crucial component of the
negotiated settlement itself, without which the Constitution would not
have come into being.2 0 7 Also, the amnesty provisions were not in-
consistent with international norms.
Two months later, however, in Mohlomi v. Minister of Defence,2"
the Court did strike down a provision under section 22, and made the
declaration of invalidity applicable to all actions instituted before or
204. The dissenters were Justice Didcott and Justice Kriegler.
205. The decision in this case was rendered on April 18, 1997, and, as of the time of
this article, was unreported. It is available on the Internet. Faculty of Law at the
University of Witwatersrand, Wits Law School: Decisions of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http'//lwvw.law.wits.ac.zaijudgements!
prinsloo.html>.
206. 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
207. Id. at 698.
208. 1997 (1) SALR 124 (CC).
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after April 27, 1994-unless by then they were time-barred or fully
determined. The provision in question was section 113(1) of the De-
fence Act of 1957, which requires all civil actions against the Minister
of Defence to be instituted within six months from the date on which
the cause of action arose. Justice Didcott, for the Court, said that such
a short time limit, given the degree of illiteracy and inaccessibility of
legal assistance in parts of South Africa, did not afford claimants an
adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress for wrongs al-
legedly done to them.20 9 The breach was not justifiable under section
33, because the state's legitimate objectives could be satisfied through
other, less stringent, means.
A related matter came before the Court in the most recent of all its
decisions to date, Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security.21° The appel-
lant contested a decision of the Witwatersrand Local Division of the
Supreme Court that a claim for constitutional damages was not good
in law. He had alleged that he had been injured in a series of assaults
by members of the South African Police Services, and that these as-
saults formed part of a pattern of widespread and persistent abuses by
the police. The provision invoked was section 7(4)(a) of the Interim
Constitution, which allows the victim of an alleged human rights abuse
to apply to court for appropriate relief.211 While not ruling out the
granting of constitutional damages in some future case, the Constitu-
tional Court unanimously held that they should not be awarded in this
case because substantial compensatory damages would be adequate.
Further, the Constitutional Court refused to award punitive damages,
since these would amount to the imposition of punishment without
the person being punished having a chance to assert his or her own
constitutional rights. Punitive damages, the court held, also represent
a drain on scarce public resources, a bold but realistic criterion for the
Court to apply.
VI. KEY FEATURES OF THE COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE TO DATE
There has been a remarkable degree of unanimity in the forty-eight
decisions announced by the Court so far. The great majority have
contained no dissents at all, and in only two have there been a sub-
stantial disagreement.212 The norm is a single judgment in which the
209. Id. at 131.
210. The decision in this case was rendered on June 5, 1997, and, as of the time of
this article, was unreported. It is available on the Internet. Faculty of Law at the
University of Witwatersrand, Wits Law School: Decisions of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/
fose.html>.
211. Section 38 of the 1996 Constitution similarly provides that a court "may grant
appropriate relief." Republic of S. Afr. Const. ch. II, § 38.
212. See S v. Coetzee. The decision in Coetzee was rendered on March 6, 1997, and,
as of the time of this article, was unreported. It is available on the Internet. Faculty of
Law at the University of Witwatersrand, Wits Law School: Decisions of the Constitu-
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other judges simply concur, although one or two of the judges, notably
Justice Didcott, seem increasingly keen to formulate their ovn rea-
sons in separate judgments. In addition, there has been a fair degree
of rotation between the judges as far as issuing the main judgment is
concerned.
All of the judgments have, on the whole, been marked by a legalism
which was probably somewhat unexpected. Even those justices with
no previous judicial experience have been careful to couch their rea-
soning in traditional legal language. Only Justice Sachs can be said to
have departed from this conservative approach at all frequently,
though this is not meant to imply that the other judges have failed to
adopt a purposive and rights-oriented attitude to their interpretative
function. No doubt this stance has been deliberately adopted in order
to prevent the Court being overfly embroiled in political controver-
sies. At the time its first members were appointed, fears were ex-
pressed that it would be a blatantly pro-ANC Court. If this is the
predominant slant, it has not become apparent so far.213
Such evaluations as have appeared in print seem to conclude that
the Court has done well during its first two years. In the words of the
Human Rights Committee, a non-governmental organization working
in the field, "even its critics allow that its performance has at least
been adequate," though that Committee itself goes on to claim that
"so far the judges have been quite unventuresome in applying the
Constitution." '214 Professor Gretchen Carpenter is more specific:
"[o]ne can only commend the members of the court for their contex-
tual approach to constitution interpretation, their willingness to ex-
amine minutely every possible interpretive option and their sedulous
attention to detail." '215 There has been an openness to considering de-
cisions on human rights in other jurisdictions, including in no small
measure the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 2 l and
even the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. The
judges have also constantly referred to the Court's own previous deci-
sions to back up their conclusions. Reference has been made repeat-
edly to the "spirit" of the Constitution and genuine attempts seem to
have been made to apply it in a way that its framers intended-or
supposedly would have intended.2 17 A pragmatic stance has been
tional Court of South Africa (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.law.its.ac.zaijudge-
mentslprinsloo.html>; S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867 (CC).
213. Of course this paper has not analyzed the Court's decisions to date on issues
other than those concerning human rights.
214. Human Rights Committee of South Africa, The Constitutional Court 1995 -
The First Year 8, 22 (1996).
215. Grethchen Carpenter, The South African Constitutional Court: Taking Stock
of the Early Decisions, 1 Hum. Rts. & Const. L.J. of S. Afr. 24. 31 (1996).
216. Cf Christof Heyns, African Human Rights Law and the European Convention,
11 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 252, 252-56 (1995) (describing mostly Nigerian law).
217. Cf. Hans-Peter Schneider, Value Judgments and the Spirit of the Constitution,
in Interpreting a Bill of Rights 68, 68-82 (Johan Kruger & Brian Currin eds., 1994).
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adopted concerning the starting dates for declarations of invalidity
and care has been taken not to rule out completely the availability of
constitutional damages as a form of relief.
CONCLUSION
In general, the Court has so far steered a delicate path between
radicalism and conservatism. In human fights cases it has invalidated
pre-1994 legislation on no fewer than sixteen occasions but it has
made it clear to Parliament that, for the sake of a greater good, such
as a reduction in the crime rate, limitations on rights can be tolerated
so long as certain safeguards are maintained. The Court has been cau-
tious in its application of the equality and non-discrimination provi-
sions, and has referred to the country's scarce resources as one factor
it must take into account when deciding upon the extent of a constitu-
tional right-while not allowing officials to plead pressure of work for
not having rectified a breach of constitutional rights in the time speci-
fied by the Court. Undoubtedly the greatest impact of the Court has
been felt in the realm of criminal procedure, with sections of the
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 struck down by the Court no fewer
than five times.
The Constitutional Court is the most powerful institution in South
Africa, the repository of the nation's sovereignty. In its exercise of
that responsibility, it has already earned much respect both at home
and abroad. If it continues to perform in the way that it has to date, it
is likely to gain even more admirers.
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